Thomas
F. Duryea
tom@duryea.us
Dr. David Churchman
HUX 594 Activity 3
Word Count: 2469
The Decline to Catastrophe 1055 to 1071
In pursuit of my investigation of
the events leading up to the Battle of Manzikert, I will focus on three main topics. The first focus will be on the political
climate of the mid eleventh century in
The State of
In the early eleventh century, the
In theory, the office of emperor was
not hereditary as Constantine the Great decreed that the Patriarch would choose
the next emperor. Nevertheless, after
The Empire could have easily
recovered from the brief three-year reign of Constantine VIII, but the nobility
chose to force another incompetent to replace him. Therefore, this trend continued with brief
reigns by ineffectual emperors until the patriarch crowned Romanus Diogenes in
1068. He tried to rebuild the empire and
its military, but it was too late.
Man after man who was completely
unqualified for the position of emperor wore the royal diadem. Why did the senate and the aristocracy allow
this? Anna Comnena writes that the
emperors would invent new honorary titles for their favorites (Comnena, 78 IV). She wrote a great length about the
interfamily struggles for power in The 
Alexiad. A
modern scholar would wonder why the rich and powerful of the 11th
century could be so self-absorbed in their personal fortunes and not see that
their fortunes depended on the fortunes of the empire. One contemporary author wrote, “O holy lord,
God raised you to the imperial office and by His grace made you a god on earth
– so to peak – to make and do what you will.” (Kekaumenos, 77) Why did they not
see that with the empire’s rapid decline, they would also loose their fortunes and
prestige as well?
The Political Setting of the Seljuk
Turks in the 11th Century
While the
The caliphs were the secular in
addition to the spiritual leaders of Islam in
Tughrul Bey’s successor was Mehmed
ibn Daud, better known as Alp Arslan[2]
(the Lion Hero). As Seljuk power grew,
they surfaced as the defenders of Sunni Islam against the infidel Shia
(Shiite). Alp Arslan wanted to destroy
the Shia Fatimid caliphate in
How
did Alp Arslan (and his successors) manage to get his nomad subject to follow
his orders? How did he keep them from
merely pursuing their traditional nomadic tendencies? How did Tughrul get the caliph to capitulate
to his leadership?
The Condition of the Byzantine Military
in the Late 11th Century
The Byzantine (Roman) had always had mercenaries or
foreign troops as part of its army.
These were normally well disciplined and relatively small in numbers. The thematic system provided a means of
maintaining the armed forces. This
assured the empire of a professional, ready military to respond to all
contingencies. After the death of Basil,
the thematic system fell into disrepair.
Successive administrations followed their hedonistic bend and decimated
both the moral and resources of the military.
By the end of the 11th century, virtually all of the light
cavalry and over half of all of the men in the Byzantine army were foreign
mercenaries. (Heath, pg. 23).
Even though these mercenaries were from diverse
homelands, most of the horse archers were of Asiatic (Turkish) backgrounds. Also included were many Frankish in the
infantry. These mercenaries were Arians
as opposed to the Orthodox Byzantines.
Add to this the Armenian Monophysites and this spelled trouble brewing
for the military, as there were troops of three different, opposing faiths
fighting for a fourth.
Loyalty is a big problem with mercenaries. Why did the empire hire mercenaries of
opposing faiths? Then after hiring them,
why did they fail to keep up with promised payments of salary? Why did they hire mercenaries from foreign
states that were not even friendly to the Byzantines? Money was one way to keep mercenaries
faithful to the Empire’s cause. An
Armenian noble gave the following advice to the Emperor, “Take exceptional care
of your soldiers.” “The foreigners and
Romans on guard around the imperial court should not be late in getting paid …”
(Kekaumenos, 80). In addition to this
advice, in the Alexiad, Anna Comnena wrote about the emperor, “In any case he
feared the recklessness of the soldiers all the more because the army was
composed of many different elements, and he wondered whether they might not
even be hatching some plot against himself.” (Comnena, 74).
Why did the emperors put themselves and the empire in
such a position? Did they not know the
consequences of their actions, or did they simply not care? Why did Romanus Diogenes take such an army to
war against the Seljuk Turks? Perhaps
Aristakes was correct when he wrote, “he arrogantly grew proud, thinking it
impossible to be vanquished by any kings born of this earth. But he did not remember the words of the
prophet that the king does not triumph through the multitude of soldiery, nor
does the giant [triumph] because of his strength, but rather through the right
hand and arm of the Omnipotent.” (Aristakes, 25)
The Seljuk Turk Army in the Late 11th
Century
A different situation faced the
leaders of the Seljuk Turk army. Poor
morale was not an issue. Neither was a
lack of pay. The Seljuk army had been successful in the field. The Seljuks were new to Islam and were full
of the fervor of new converts to the prophet.
Motivation was high and moral was high. The regular army members were
relatives to one another, as the Seljuks were all clans of the Oguz Turks. Were there any problems amongst the military
members or were the Seljuks the perfect fighting machine?
The Seljuk army consisted of two
main groups. The first group was the gazis.
The gazis were Seljuk Turks who known as “warriors of the Islamic
faith”. They were horsemen, mounted
archers, well skilled at their trade.
Organized into tribal bands, their main responsibility was defending the
frontiers of the caliphate. They often
fought against other Turkic peoples, but they remained loyal to the cause of
the prophet. Mamluks comprised the other
group. These were slave-soldiers of
conquered peoples. For the Seljuk army,
the Mamluks consisted mainly of Circassians and Kurds, both minorities in
The Seljuk leaders were engaged in
state building. They saw themselves as
the defenders of Sunni Islam against the Shiite (Shia). They wanted to leave the nomadic, barbarian
lifestyle and become an imperial power.
Their goal was to eliminate the Shiite “infidels” in
The Seljuk nobility wanted to build
an empire and rid the world of the Shiites.
Their military, on the other hand, only wanted to continue their
nomadic, raiding ways. Were the nobles
able to reign in these nomadic warriors to complete their mission? Were the Gazis convinced to provide the
service of patrolling roads, collecting taxes and live within the framework of
this bureaucratic state? How were the
nobles able to get the Gazis to do anything for the good of the state? What compromise did they work out between the
two groups that eventually ended up in the creation of the Sultanate of Rum
(Seljuk Empire)? Did the Seljuks have
problems with the Mamluks deserting?
Military Logistics of the Byzantine
Military in the 11th Century
Moving a large army long distances has always been a
challenge to strategic planners. History
is full of stories of large armies traveling long distances to meet their
enemy. The Greeks used thousands of
ships to reach
The Roman (Byzantine) army consisted of infantry,
light cavalry and heavy cavalry. The
most direct route from
The huge Byzantine army consisted of about only 40%
combatants. The other 60% were
engineers, laborers and servants. They
operated the siege engines (battering rams, etc.), tended to the knight’s armor
and horses and drove the “thousands” of wagons that contained the military
equipment needed for the campaign. (Heath, 24).
Why did the emperor march this huge support team along his serpentine
route to Erzerum? Why did he not have
the majority of them march a more direct route under the guidance of one or
more of his generals? Perhaps a more
important question is, why did he not send his heavy equipment with his navy to
the city of Trebizond (Trabzon) and from there march the 4 days walk to Erzurum
instead of the almost 6 months march?
What had happened to the once mighty navy? Why did the military leaders and the emperor
plan this long troop movement better?
Logistics of the Seljuk Army in the 11th
Century
The Seljuk army consisted of foot soldiers and light
cavalry, with the absence of large siege engines. The Seljuk army was lighter and had less
distance to cover than the Byzantines, but they had problems of their own. While the Byzantines crossed over the valleys
and low passes of central
The
early summer snows in
The Seljuks had other logistical
problems. The Seljuk army was mainly
light cavalry. Turkish cavalry units
generally maintained up to 18 horses per rider. (Ross) With a cavalry of 40,000 riders, this would
mean supporting and moving up to 720,000 horses. Add to this the support horses and donkeys,
how did the Seljuks support this large amount of livestock?
The Turkish tribes could
traditionally move large mounted armies across thousands of miles of steppe
grasslands, but how did they manage to move across high mountain passes and the
near barren plains around
In
Conclusion
What was the political climate of
the eleventh century in
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